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THE BUSINESS MODEL OF  
BROKERS IN BANGLADESH,  
GHANA AND SINGAPORE:  
LESSONS FOR POLICY
Main messages 
• Whilst brokers are complicit in perpetuating precarious 
working conditions and subservient forms of behaviour they 
are still in demand among would-be migrants because they 
get them to the destination and provide a range of services
• Foremost among these is help in managing migration risks 
by meeting the upfront costs of migration, assistance with 
accommodation, food and clothing at destination, support in 
between jobs and sharing the burden of defaulted loans
• Informal brokers act as cultural brokers, helping migrants 
from remote rural areas navigate unfamiliar and intimidating 
procedures and societies; and as power brokers, representing 
migrants in negotiations with employers over wages and 
working conditions
• Brokers also act as guarantors for migrants where character 
references are important and this is much valued by 
employers 
• Brokerage is fuelled by regulations and environments that 
are difficult for migrants to negotiate and efforts to eliminate 
it will prove futile unless more accessible and pro-migrant 
measures are implemented.
APRIL 2017
Page 1
Page 2 migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk
Methods
Evidence was generated mainly through qualitative 
research as the objective was to understand the social 
relationships that underpin brokerage. However, the 
selection of respondents was aided by the household 
surveys conducted as these provided background data 
on household characteristics, migration patterns, assets 
and incomes. In total, 44 in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with migrant workers; 69 with 
formally registered and informal brokers at various levels 
of the hierarchy and 47 with key informants including 
employers, government officials, border control agencies, 
trade unions and civil society organisations. Interviews 
were supplemented with observation, monitoring 
advertisements for migrant workers in the press and 
informal discussions in source and destination areas.
What we found
Brokers have been demonised as exploiters of migrant 
labour due to the level of control they can exercise over 
migrants who have no other means of support. However, 
there is another side to this process which sheds light on 
why migrants keep using brokers. 
Case Study 1: Bangladesh 
Chapainawabganj in Bangladesh is a high migration 
district near the border with India, where large numbers 
of men from farming families migrate to Qatar for 
construction work.  In the Bangladeshi popular discourse, 
brokers are called Adam Bepari which translates to 
“traders in human beings” typifying the view which gives 
all the power to the broker and deprives the migrant 
of any control over the process. Similar descriptors 
demonising recruiters are seen in other countries.
The government response has been to heavily regulate 
or eliminate brokers altogether but this has rarely 
succeeded. There were several reasons why Bangladeshi 
men continued to migrate through informal brokers. First, 
legal migration through the Kafala system is expensive 
and difficult because their skills may not match the jobs 
that are available. Secondly, they felt more protected by 
the “moral contract” with the broker, witnessed by kin 
and village elders. Third, many wanted to obtain “free 
visas” i.e. not be tied to a single employer. Although 
these were completely illegal they offered migrants the 
possibility of moving on to better jobs through social 
networks in Qatar and this was possible only through a 
broker-facilitated irregular migration route.
Background
A top priority for governments and human rights 
organisations aiming to end trafficking, forced labour, 
and modern slavery in migration is to “break the business 
model” of brokers who are believed to be the main 
channel through which exploitation occurs. 
According to the Global Slavery Index, an estimated 
45.8 million people are enslaved in the world today 
generating an estimated $150.2 billion a year in profits. 
Both domestic work and construction work have attracted 
global attention as occupations where situations of forced 
labour and slavery are widespread due to a combination 
of factors including a lack of written contracts, the hidden 
nature of the work inside private homes (in the case of 
domestic workers), non-compliance with labour laws, and 
the prevalence of labour market intermediaries or brokers. 
Migrant workers from poorer countries and marginalised 
communities are heavily represented in both occupations. 
Often, the only way they can negotiate complex 
immigration and work permit regulations is with the help 
of migration brokers who possess the skills, knowledge and 
connections needed to traverse these different worlds. 
Brokers are equally important for internal migration, 
helping people in remote rural areas access work in urban 
locations where employers look for guarantors to vouch 
for their honesty and ability to work hard. 
Our contribution to existing knowledge 
Our research on migration industries - or the range of 
institutions, agencies and individuals including brokers 
that together make it possible for a migrant to migrate 
- in Bangladesh, Ghana and Singapore shows a more 
complex reality where brokers are both complicit in 
perpetuating exploitation and conditions of forced 
labour but also supportive in helping migrants with 
their own agendas for bargaining for better working 
conditions and self-development.
The research provides insights into hitherto unknown 
aspects of the structure and functioning of the 
migration industry. It also attempts to convey the 
advantages and disadvantages of migrating through 
a broker from the perspective of the migrant. This 
viewpoint shows how migrants’ understanding of the 
risks and success of such migration and the reliability 
of brokers is at variance with the dominant discourse 
which focuses on comparing working conditions against 
international standards of decent work. Migrants take a 
longer-term view, where they are prepared to trade off 
poor working conditions in the short term to improve 
their social position and wealth in the longer term.
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Brokers are thus an important part of migrants’ strategies 
to negotiate with their employers which they would 
otherwise struggle with given the highly unequal power 
relationship. Unlike formal agencies, informal brokers 
also helped employers with recommendations on 
character and behaviour which was regarded as very 
important by female employers when recruiting another 
female to work in their home.
Case Study 3: Singapore  
Singapore is an important destination for migrant 
domestic workers from poorer countries in the region 
including Indonesia. There were roughly 125,000 
Indonesian maids in Singapore in 2016. Brokerage is 
endemic along this migration route because of the 
training, certification and placement procedures which 
are too difficult and expensive for migrants to negotiate 
on their own. Often the first point of contact for a 
migrant is an informal broker in their village who then 
links up to formally registered brokers on either side 
of the border. Brokers often pay the costs of migration 
upfront and while this allows women to migrate 
with minimal capital outlay (unlike men migrating for 
construction work who must pay themselves), it binds 
them to the employer and worker and leaves them with 
little money or freedom while they are in the first 8-9 
month repayment period. 
Debt-migration has been compared to modern slavery. 
However, research with migrant worker and agents 
shows that debt can both enable and constrain migrants’ 
freedoms – on the one hand migrants are trapped 
until they repay but in the long term they may improve 
housing and childrens’ education prospects. Scrutinising 
the circulation of debt between migrant, broker and 
employer also shows that contrary to their negative 
image in the dominant discourse, brokers are not simply 
‘merchants of labour’ who seek to maximise profit at the 
expense of the worker. In cases where a worker defaults 
on a loan, brokers may distribute the liability to various 
parties within the migration industry, usually between 
employers and themselves. This provides a measure of 
leverage for the worker and may not result in her being 
penalised for not paying back the loan.
Even though brokers did not deliver on promises related 
to wages, working conditions and contracts, the migrants 
that we interviewed regarded the migration as successful 
because they had reached Qatar and found work, 
however exploitative. They had factored in hardship and 
precarity in the short term to achieve long term goals of 
improved living standards for their families and better 
prospects for their children.
Case Study 2: Ghana 
Brokerage is widespread in rural-urban migration for 
domestic work within Ghana but little is known about its 
workings and implications for the welfare of migrants. 
Migration from the poorer regions of Ghana in the north 
to urban areas in the south, especially the capital city of 
Accra, is an important part of the livelihood portfolio of 
less well-off families. Domestic work – which is typically 
low-paid and insecure – is an important source of 
employment for women and girls from such backgrounds. 
Their migration and entry into domestic work in southern 
urban centres is often facilitated and sustained by an 
entire industry centred around recruitment agencies and 
their chains of brokers and sub-agents, both formal and 
informal, as well as migrants’ own social networks.
Here too brokers are widely regarded unscrupulous 
traders who exploit vulnerable domestic workers. 
However, interviews with migrants, employers and 
brokers show a complex picture where it is difficult to 
draw a line between the role of brokers as exploiters 
and their role as protectors or negotiators on behalf of 
the workers. While they are certainly responsible for 
maintaining the status quo by pressuring workers to 
accept exploitative terms and behave in subservient 
ways, they also help migrants with settling into urban 
areas by providing temporary housing and food as well 
as money for the journey and buying new clothes which 
they then deduct gradually once the worker starts 
earning. Brokers also help migrants with bargaining and 
job-switching for better working conditions.
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Looking to the future 
What is striking is that although all three contexts 
were very different in terms of culture and the type of 
migration, there were marked similarities. 
The reluctance of migrants and employers to engage with 
the formal system and their strong preference for informal 
brokers whom they trusted. There are some context specific 
differences. In Ghana and Bangladesh, formal agencies are 
not designed to help migrants with the things that they need 
most which is someone who can shepherd them through 
complex procedures, provide financing when needed, 
provide other forms of support in alien environments, and 
negotiate on their behalf with employers. 
While the money made through migration via brokers may 
be lower than migrants with formal contracts who find 
work through official agencies, it is an important means of 
accessing labour markets that would otherwise be beyond 
the reach of many would-be migrants. In Singapore, only 
formal brokers were interviewed and they were sharing 
the risks of defaulted loans as well as helping migrants to 
access jobs in accordance with government regulations.
1.  Governments should work with civil society to gain a 
deeper understanding of the support that migrants 
need along the journey and at destination to find ways 
of providing such support in accessible ways including 
cheap loans and accommodation.
Contact
This brief was written by Priya Deshingkar  
(P.Deshingkar@sussex.ac.uk), please contact her if you 
require further information.
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Further reading
Abrar CR, Deshingkar P, Sultana MT, Haque NH and Reza MS (2017) Emic perspectives on brokering international migration for 
construction from Bangladesh to Qatar. Migrating out of Poverty WP 49. http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/documents/
wp49-abrar-et-al--emic-perspectives-on-brokering-international-migration.pdf
Awumbila M, Deshingkar P, Kandilige L, Teye JK and Setrana M (2017) Brokerage in migrant domestic work in Ghana: complex 
social relations and mixed outcomes, Migrating out of Poverty WP 47 http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/files/file.
php?name=wp47-awumbila-et-al-2017-brokerage-in-migrant-domestic-work-in-ghana.pdf&site=354
Goh C, Wee K and Yeoh BSA (2017) Who’s holding the bomb? Debt-financed migration in Singapore’s domestic work industry. 
Migrating out of Poverty WP 38. http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/documents/wp38-goh-et-al-2016-whos-holding-the-
bomb-debt-financed-migration-in-singapores-domestic-work-industry.pdf
ILO (forthcoming) Global Estimates of Modern Slavery and Child Labour,  
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/lang--en/index.htm
Walk Free Foundation (2016) Global Slavery Index Report http://www.globalslaveryindex.org/download/
2.  Researchers should work with civil society to raise 
awareness in government and the general public about 
the transformative potential of migration into low paid 
work and the facilitative role that brokers play in the 
absence of accessible alternatives.
3.  Advocacy organisations working for migrant and labour 
rights should be sensitised to the transformative 
potential of migration in reducing poverty, improving 
educational outcomes and social repositioning in 
societies at origin.
Finally, policy makers would do well to recognise that 
brokerage is fuelled by tightening border controls, 
work permit systems, and unwelcoming urban areas. 
Launching an attack on brokerage without easing 
migration barriers will not work. In fact, there may be 
some lessons from brokerage practice that could help in 
the development of more migrant friendly procedures 
and practices. There are strong parallels between the 
situation seen within and between countries in the global 
South and what is unfolding now between countries 
in Europe and Africa. Until such time that legal and 
legitimate migration is not only a privilege enjoyed by a 
rich and educated minority, brokerage is here to stay. 
